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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The South African insurance industry has evolved and changed dramatically from the past to 
the present and now is highly regulated, meaning that not only the common law but also 
several statutes regulate the insurance industry. In the past the broker or agent, as they were 
called, were the only people who would link the insurer and the insured (prospective 
policyholder).1 Over and above these brokers and agents, nowadays there are telemarketers, call 
centres, “social media” and even retailers, banks and other companies that offer insurance or are 
a link between their customers and the insurance companies. I believe that these “people” can 
safely be called “intermediaries and or advisors” as envisaged by insurance statutes, being the 
Long-Term Insurance Act2 (LTIA); the Short-Term Insurance Act3 (STIA) and the Financial 
Advisory and Intermediary Services Act4 (FAIS Act) or the 2018 Policyholders Protection Rules 
(PPRs) and the General Codes of Conduct (GCC). 
 
The prospective policyholder must decide what insurance protection is needed, given the risks 
faced, and then compare policies in order to decide which is best suited for his or her particular 
needs. The intermediary will help a  prospective policyholder of insurance to identify their 
risk and coverage needs as well as match these buyers with suitable insurers. It is precisely the 
intermediary’s knowledge of the insurance market and insurance services, as well as their ability 
to find appropriate insurers to provide price quotations, which makes the use of an intermediary 
appealing.  
 
The principal role of the insurance intermediary and/or advisor is to bring together the insurer 
and the insured, thereby facilitating the creation of a contract between the insurer and the 
insured. An intermediary and or advisor will offer what are called intermediary services to both 
                                                             
1  Millard “The impact of the Twin Peaks model on the insurance industry” 2016 PELJ 14.  
2  Act 52 of 1998. 
3  Act 53 of 1998. 
4  Act 37 of 2002. 
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the insurer and the insured. “Intermediary service” refers to any act other than the furnishing of 
advice that is performed by a person for or on behalf of a client or product supplier that results in 
the client entering into or offering to enter into any transaction in respect of a financial product 
with a product supplier. It is possible for an insurance company to deal directly with its clients, 
but this seldom happens. Most contracts of insurance transpire as a result of interactions between 
the insurer, the insured and an insurance intermediary. The fact that a third party – the 
intermediary – forms part of the picture means that other, separate contracts are needed to cover 
the legal relationship existing between the intermediary and the insured and between the 
intermediary and the insurer. These preliminary contracts may be regarded as contracts entered 
into with a view to creating an insurance contract in future.5 
 
It is in fact during the negotiation stage of the insurance contract when it is important that the 
intermediary discloses all material aspects of the insurance contract to the insured. During this 
phase, any onerous clauses, meaning clauses that place obligations or burdens or an 
extraordinary duty on a person that may have a direct impact on the policyholder should be 
brought to the policyholder’s attention. 
 
This situation should, however, be distinguished from the doctrine of disclosure in insurance 
where the prospective policyholder has a duty to disclose facts that are material to the risk to be 
insured. Non-disclosure for purposes of this dissertation pertains to non-disclosure by the insurer 
or his agent or intermediary of clauses, such as explaining the main benefits of the product and 
what is covered; what is not covered or is excluded; how claims may be made; how complaints 
may be made; how the product may be renewed, switched or cancelled; to which law the product 
is subject, exclusions, subrogation, average, time bars, excess waiting periods, and/or renewals of 
the policy.  
 
This dissertation examines the intermediary‘s duty to disclose the above-mentioned onerous 
clauses to the prospective policyholder, and how, despite this duty of disclosure being codified in 
South African law, intermediaries still fall short of what is expected from them in terms of the 
statutes and regulations. Compliance with these statutes and/or regulations has become a mere 
                                                             
5  Millard Modern Insurance Law in South Africa (2013) 55. 
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formality of a “ticking a box” exercise rather than adopting an intelligent approach to selling 
insurance, which includes ensuring that the policyholder has full knowledge and understanding 
of the insurance contract and the terms to which he or she is binding him or herself.  
 
1.2 Problem statement 
 
Despite a strict legislative regime and pro-consumer developments, insurance intermediaries still 
fail to disclose material and onerous terms in their dealings with prospective policyholders. This 
dissertation investigates the rules that aim to regulate the up-front, honest disclosure of onerous 
terms to the prospective policyholder, and tries to answer the question of whether the 
intermediaries and advisors comply with their duties to disclose onerous terms to prospective 
policyholders. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
In answering this research question, this thesis will use a doctrinal approach. The starting point 
will be a review of South African law to sketch the prevalence of the problem and will conclude 
by answering the problem statement.6  
 
1.4 Limitations of the study 
 
Ideally, an in-depth analysis of court cases versus FAISA Ombud decisions over the past decade 
would have provided a firm basis for the statement that the FAIS Ombud is more pro-consumer 
when it comes to the duties that are placed on intermediaries to disclose onerous terms. Due to 
the high volume of Ombud cases, it is not possible to conduct such an in-depth analysis, which is 
why some recent examples of Ombud cases will be contrasted against the most well-known court 
case, namely, Lappeman Diamond Cutting Works (Pty) Ltd v MIB Group (Pty) Ltd. 
 
1.5 Overview of chapters 
                                                             
6  For an explanation of the nature of doctrinal legal research, see Hutchinson and Duncan “Defining and 
describing what we do: Doctrinal legal research” (2012) Deakin Law Review 83. 
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Chapter 2 sets out the common law position regarding the intermediary’s duties. It looks at the 
fact that no duty of disclosure was placed on the insurer or intermediary, but rather a duty to act 
in good faith and with due care and skill. These duties have not been replaced by legislation and 
are naturalia of an insurance contract. The chapter further sets out the case law, recognising that 
there is a duty to disclose that should be placed on insurance intermediaries. 
 
Chapter 3 interrogates the current legislative framework and how, prior to the enactment of the 
FAIS Act, the LTIA, STIA and the PRRs pertaining to intermediaries were substandard and gave 
rise to a self-regulating environment governed by the common law. This chapter takes an in-
depth look at the sections applying to intermediaries as set out in the FAIS Act and the GCC, as 
well as recent PPRs and the embed decisions, and why despite the enactment of such legislation, 
which on the face of it appears to be clear and in plain language, intermediaries continue to fail 
in their duties to disclose. 
 
Chapter 4 compares the FAIS Ombud decisions with the Lappeman Diamond case, which 
illustrates the Ombud’s ability to infuse fairness into its judgments and allows it to be more pro-
consumer.   
 
Chapter 5 contains conclusions and the summary to the answer of the question that was set out 
in chapter 1, namely, whether intermediaries and advisors comply with their duties to disclose 
onerous terms to prospective policyholders. 
  
Page 8 of 40 
 
 
CHAPTER 2:  
COMMON LAW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter we look at the position of intermediaries and advisors prior to the introduction of 
the FAIS Act. There were many common law duties placed on an intermediary when dealing 
with a prospective policyholder, such as acting in good faith when concluding the insurance 
contract with the said policyholder and acting with due care and skill.7 
 
2.2 Duties placed on insurance intermediaries 
 
Insurance law is a mixture of statutory and common law. Many aspects of the law of contract 
also apply to insurance law. Generally speaking, “[A] contract of insurance may be defined 
either as a contract to compensate the insured for a patrimonial loss proximately caused by the 
uncertain event insured against, or as a contract to satisfy the insured for a non-patrimonial loss 
consequent upon the occurrence of the uncertain event insured against”.8 
 
Insurance was originally defined in Lake v Reinsurance Corporation Ltd9 as “a contract between 
an insurer (or assurer) and an insured (or assured), whereby the insurer undertakes, in return for 
the payment of a price or premium, to render to the insured a sum of money, or its equivalent, on 
the happening of a specified uncertain event in which the insured has some interest”. 
 
The contract of agency governed the relationship between insurers, their representatives or 
employees, brokers and clients.10 Agency occurs when an agent performs a juristic act on behalf 
                                                             
7  Havenga The Law of Insurance Intermediaries (2001). 
8  Reinecke, Van der Merwe, Van Niekerk and Havenga General Principles of Insurance Law (2002) 61. 
9  1967 3 SA 124 (W) 127 (A). 
10  Hattingh and Millard The FAIS Act Explained (2016) 74; Reinecke et al (n 8) 337; Havenga The Law of 
Insurance Intermediaries (2001) 1. 
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of another (the principal).11 However, in the context of insurance the term ‘agent’ is used loosely 
to refer to the representative, employee or broker who acts on behalf of either an insurer or an 
insured.12 It was often difficult to determine the exact nature of the relationship between the 
insurer, the insured (or potential insured) and the representative, employee or broker and to 
outline the rights and duties of the respective parties. 
 
The “agent” could perform a variety of functions, namely, to execute a mandate of the principal; 
to represent the principal in entering into a legal relationship; and to negotiate between different 
principals.13 
 
As far as the execution of the principal’s mandate is concerned, it could entail a go-between 
completing an application form on behalf of a prospective policyholder; collecting and receiving 
information for an insurer on a prospective insured; or providing information on behalf of a 
principal.14 
 
In order for a contract of agency to be valid, the following requirements have to be met, namely: 
 
 the parties must have contractual capacity; 
 the parties must have reached consensus on what needs to be done; 
 the contract must not be illegal; 
 performance must be physically possible; 
 formalities must be complied with; and 
 the agent must have the authority to act on behalf of the principal.15 
 
2.3 Practical difficulties due to the nature of insurance 
 
The obligations placed on agents and mandatories by common law are probably adequate in most 
                                                             
11  Reinecke et al (n 8) 337; Havenga (n 10) 2; Nienaber & Reinecke Life insurance in South Africa: A 
compendium: A new perspective from the office of the Ombudsman for Long-Term Insurance (2009) 201. 
12  Nienaber and Reinecke (n 11) 201. 
13  ibid. 
14  ibid. 
15  Van Jaarsveld “Agency” in Nagel (ed) Commercial Law (2006) 159; Hatting and Millard (n 10) 75. 
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instances where third parties act on behalf of principals. However, there are complexities 
associated with financial products (of which insurance products form part) that prompted the 
legislature to draft the FAIS Act. Moolman et al16 summarise these problems as follows: 
 
 the incorporeal nature of a financial product; 
 the standard form of contracts; 
 asymmetry of information; and 
 unprofessionalism.17 
 
The incorporeal nature of financial products distinguishes these products from other consumer 
goods. The buyer of a power drill will be able to establish whether the drill works as soon as he 
opens the box. However, the purchaser of a long-term insurance policy will probably never know 
whether the product represented value for money. Standard forms of contracts refer to a ‘take it 
or leave it’ approach in terms of which companies do not offer too many choices to consumers 
and end up selling products that are not suited to the consumer’s needs. 
 
Asymmetry of information means that a client who meets a supplier of financial services often 
has no idea in what capacity the supplier acts, what his responsibilities are towards the client, and 
what exactly the financial product offered entails. 
 
Unprofessionalism refers to a lack of skill and knowledge that leads agents and mandataries to 
‘mis-sell’ financial products. Financial products are complex and those who render services 
relating to financial products need to deal with knowledgeable individuals who are up to date 
with the latest products and who also have the skills to sell appropriate products to consumers. 
There clearly was a need for a stricter regulatory regime for agents and mandataries.18 
 
When concluding an insurance agreement, the prospective policyholder either deals directly with 
the insurance company or with an intermediary or agent. It is the duty of the intermediary or 
                                                             
16  Moolman, Pillai, Bam and Appasamy Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Guide (2010) 5. 
17  ibid. 
18  Millard (n 5); Moolman et al (n 16) 10-12. 
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agent (acting on behalf of the insurer) to facilitate the conclusion of contract with the 
policyholder.  
 
In terms of the rules of agency, the intermediary represents the insurer in performing the juristic 
act, in this case entering into an insurance contract with the prospective policyholder. Therefore, 
there will always be more than two parties to the insurance contract. 
 
2.4 Intermediaries’ disclosure duties 
 
As insurance is arranged by means of an insurance contract; the rights and duties of the parties to 
the contract are governed by the law of contract, as applied to insurance contracts. Furthermore, 
liability claims arise mainly from the law of delict. 
 
When applying the more general principles pertaining to the contract of agency to insurance, it 
becomes apparent that the very first duty of an intermediary is to disclose all the material 
information of which he is aware, pertaining to the insurance contract, to the prospective 
policyholder.19 This duty to disclose that is placed on the intermediary is onerous and may be far 
more than merely disclosing what falls within his knowledge.20 
 
The intermediary is required to do more than just warn the policyholder of the material clauses. 
The intermediary must in fact ensure that the policyholder is well-informed of his obligations 
recorded in the insurance contract to enable the policyholder to disclose all the necessary 
information required to complete the insurance contract. 
 
The principal role of the insurance intermediary is to bring together the insurer and the insured, 
thereby facilitating the creation of a contract between the insurer and the insured. This is the 
service for which the intermediary will be remunerated, in the form of a commission from the 
insurer. However, the insurance intermediary may choose to provide additional services. 
Essentially the intermediary is rewarded by the insurer for bringing business to the insurer. It is 
                                                             
19  Hattingh and Millard (n 10) 36. 
20  Havenga (n 10) 35.  
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possible for the intermediary also (or exclusively) to be rewarded by the insured for service 
provided – the fee for service model. Most insurance products are complex goods; to choose 
between the diverse options and suppliers available requires some expertise in the field. The 
buyer of insurance is faced with a difficult decision in that the choice of product and insurer will 
depend on a number of factors, including the reputation of the insurance company for the 
efficient payment of losses and the financial capability of the insurer to sustain the losses. The 
buyer must decide what insurance protection is needed given the risks faced and then compare 
policies in order to decide which is best suited for the buyer’s particular needs. The intermediary 
will help buyers of insurance identify their risk and coverage needs as well as match these buyers 
with suitable insurers. The distribution of insurance occurs through a variety of channels, with 
many insurers marketing their insurance products directly to buyers either by mail, 
telemarketing, or sales representatives or like in nowadays through social Medias. However, 
most insurance transactions will involve an intermediary who will link the buyer of insurance 
and the insurer and essentially be the link between these two parties. 
 
In addition to the duty to disclose all material information, the intermediary is also required in 
terms of the common law to act in good faith when dealing with a policyholder. This duty 
includes the duty on both the insurer and intermediary to disclose material terms that place 
special obligations on the prospective policyholder prior to the conclusion of the insurance 
contract. Although good faith is one of the cornerstones of contract law, it is not a requirement 
for the validity of a contract, of amendments to a contract or for pre-contractual negotiations. 
 
It therefore is a value that underlies the law of contract and can be said to be based on 
community standards of decency and fairness that underlie and inform the substantive law of 
contract21.  
 
2.5 Duty to act in good faith 
 
                                                             
21  Hutchinson “Non-variation clauses in contract: Any escape from the Shifren straitjacket?” 2001 South 
African Law Journal 720 743-744; Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (HHA) para 22; Barnard “Death, mourning and 
melancholia in post-modern contract: A  call for (re)establishing contract’s connection with the ethical” 2006 
Stellenbosch Law Review 386. 
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The duty of good faith in relation to the duty of disclosure to a prospective policyholder pertains 
to the simple truth that an insurer must be in a position to quantify the possibility of loss “to a 
degree of probability”.22 The common law duties to act in good faith with care and skill are 
naturalia of the insurance contract, which means that it is automatically applicable by operation 
of law.23 In Stander v Raubenheimer24 this duty was deemed a natural of the insurance 
contract.25 
 
Before the decision in Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v Oudtshoorn Municipality,26 
insurance contracts were said to be contracts of “utmost good faith”. In this case the court held: 
 
The duty of disclosure is imposed ex lege. It is not based upon an implied term of the contract of 
insurance. Nor does it flow from the requirement of bona fides ... By our law all contracts are 
bona fidei ... yet the duty of disclosure is not common to all types of contract. It is restricted to 
those contracts such as contracts of insurance, where it is required ex lege.27 
 
The insurer therefore requires information about all those facts that will affect the risk and only 
then can the insurer calculate the risk, decide whether or not to insure the risk and ultimately 
impose restrictions on the insured amount and other conditions and exclusions in the contract. 
 
It therefore is predominantly in the pre-contractual phase that good faith plays a very important 
role. Generally speaking, misrepresentation has the effect of influencing consensus.28 During the 
pre-contractual stage, parties are still to negotiate the contract and this means that the duty to 
disclose cannot be a pre-contractual one, which is why a breach of this duty (misrepresentation) 
is a delict.29  
 
                                                             
22  Reincecke et al (n 8). 
23  Hattingh and Millard (n 10) 79. 
24  1996 2 SA 670 (O). 
25  Havenga (n 10) 21. 
26  1985 1 SA 419 (A) 433. 
27  Kerr “The duty to disclose in a pre-contractual context: Good faith and the role of the reasonable man” 
1985 SALJ 611; 1985 1 SA 419 (A) 433A-C. 
Prozesky-Kuschke “Specific aspects of insurance contracts and indemnity and non-indemnity insurance” in 
Nagel (ed) Commercial Law (2015) 367. 
29  Hattingh and Millard (n 10) 73; Reinecke et al (n 8) 136. 
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The duty to disclose is a duty that exists by the operation of law prior to the contract being 
entered into.30 The court further held:  
 
[A] breach of this duty of disclosure amounts to mala fides or fraud, entitling the aggrieved party 
to avoid the contract of insurance31 … It is implied in the Roman-Dutch authorities and also in 
accordance with the general principles of our law, that the court applies the reasonable man test, 
by deciding, upon a consideration of the relevant facts of the particular case, whether or not the 
undisclosed information or facts are reasonably relative to the risk or the assessment of the 
premiums, and if the answer is in the positive, the undisclosed information or facts are material.32 
 
The common law position in fact was codified by section 59 of the LTIA and section 53 of the 
STIA, which contained the exact same wording. The essence of these sections was found in sub-
sections 59(1)(b) and 53(1)(b) which stated that the misrepresentation or non-disclosure in 
question “shall be regarded as material if a reasonable, prudent person would consider that the 
particular information constituting the representation or which was not disclosed, as the case may 
be, should have been correctly disclosed to the insurer so that the insurer could form its own 
view as to the effect of such information on the assessment of the relevant risk”. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter looked in brief at duties of the intermediary as an agent and representative of the 
prospective insurer through common law, however one can see that the intermediaries did not 
adhered strictly to those duties, and the legislature then deemed it fit to introduce the FAIS Act in 
order to regulate the functions of the intermediaries including their actions and duties.  
  
                                                             
30  Kerr (n 27) 611.  
31  Andrew John Miles Hollely v Auto & General Insurance Company Limited Case No 4/31731 
(W) 10 (unreported).  
32  Kerr (n 27) 611 614; 1985 1 SA 419 (A) 435F. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
STATUTARY PROVISIONS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The common law duties of agency and representation that were discussed in the previous chapter 
were supplemented by the FAIS Act and its codes. It is this Act (the FAIS), the PPRs in terms of 
the LTIA and STIA and the GCC that govern the activities of the intermediaries, as stated before. 
The IA does not have specific rules on intermediaries. This chapter will scrutinise these duties.   
 
3.2 FAIS Act 
 
The FAIS Act came into effect on 30 September 2004. The purpose of the Act, stated in the 
Preamble, is to regulate the rendering of certain financial advisory and intermediary services to 
clients; to repeal or amend certain laws; and to provide for matters incidental thereto. Section 
1(6) of the FAIS Act provides that “[t]his Act must be construed as being in addition to any other 
law not inconsistent with its provisions and not as replacing any such law”. This means that 
providers of financial products must comply with the requirements of the FAIS Act as well as 
with the requirements of the statute(s) that regulate the products they sell. For insurers and 
insurance intermediaries, the LTIA and the STIA are the two main pieces of legislation that need 
to be taken into account, including the rules states in the PPR and GCC.  
 
The move towards transparency duties being placed on the insurer led to the enactment of the 
FAIS Act. The LTIA and STIA only regulate insurance products whereas the FAIS Act regulates 
all advice and intermediary services for all kinds of insurance products. The 2018 PPRs in terms 
of the LTIA and the STIA have also been enacted in order to enhance transparency.33 
 
The FAIS Act was introduced to regulate the activities of all intermediaries and advisors that 
                                                             
33  Millard and Kuschke “Transparency, trust and security: An evaluation of the insurer’s pre-contractual 
duties” 2014 PER PELJ 2411 2442 2443. 
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sold financial products. As the statutory definition of “financial product” includes insurance, the 
entire Act applies to the insurance business. 
 
A close reading of the definitions given for “intermediary’ in each of the three statutes shows 
them to be broadly similar. The definitions are not identical but neither are they in conflict with 
one another. The fact that both the STIA and the LTIA offer more detailed definitions of 
intermediary than the FAIS Act is not problematic. This is because the first two Acts are 
concerned with a specific type of intermediary service, insurance, and thus need to include 
insurance-specific information relating to, for example, the collection of insurance premiums, 
while the FAIS Act, because it is concerned with intermediary services generally, need only 
provide broad, generally applicable definitions.34 
 
The FAIS Act deals with rules applicable to monitoring pre-contractual negotiations between the 
intermediary and the prospective policyholder.35 
 
Advisors must advise a client of the most suitable products to meet that client’s needs. Although 
seemingly obvious and simple, the advisor must be cognisant to discharge this duty with 
reasonable care and skill. This duty includes warning the client of the risks of being uninsured 
and underinsured; referring a client to experts where applicable; and explaining each element of 
the cover provided. 
 
The FAIS Act, in terms of section 20, establishes the office of the Ombud, whose main objective 
is to resolve cases that have been referred to it by policyholders against financial service 
providers whom they believe did not comply with Act. The Ombud will normally consider and 
dispose of the complaint in a procedurally fair, informal, economical and expeditious manner 
and by reference to what is equitable in all circumstances, with due regard to the contractual 
arrangement or other legal relationships between the complainant and any other party to the 
complaint and the provisions of the FAIS Act.  
 
                                                             
34  Millard (n 5)61. 
35  ibid. 
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However, despite the establishment of the office of the Ombud, a number of cases are still 
reported every year pertaining to the intermediary‘s failure to disclose material onerous clauses 
in the contract. 
 
3.3 GCC in terms of the FAIS Act 
 
Section 15 of the FAIS Act provides for the establishment of the GCC for authorised financial 
service providers and their representatives. The GCC is based on the intermediary’s ability to 
deal with clients and give specific information relating to the insurance products being 
purchased. The GCC provides for numerous duties. However, this dissertation deals with those 
relating to the disclosure duties placed on the intermediary. In terms of the FAIS Act, the 
intermediary is required to communicate material terms of the insurance contract to the 
prospective policyholder. The failure of an intermediary to comply with the duties set out in the 
FAIS Act amounts to a breach of a statutory duty and is indicative of the intermediary‘s 
wrongfulness.36 What is clear from the FAIS Act is that an intermediary is required to ensure that 
the policyholder understands onerous clauses contained in the contract. 
 
In terms of the GCC “a provider must at all times render financial services honestly, fairly, with 
due skill, care and diligence, and in the interests of their clients and the integrity of the financial 
services industry”.37 The most important source of rights and duties is recorded in chapter 6 of 
the FAIS Act at section 15 which provides for the drafting of the GCC, and section 1638 which 
                                                             
36  Hattingh and Millard (n 10) 85-86. 
37  Clause 2 of  the GCC. 
38  Act 37 of 2002. S 16(1) stipulates the following: “A code of conduct must be drafted in such a manner as to 
ensure that the clients being rendered financial services will be able to make informed decisions; that their 
reasonable financial needs regarding financial products will be appropriately and suitably satisfied and that for those 
purposes authorised financial services providers, and their representatives, are obliged by the provisions of such 
code to (a) act honestly and fairly, and with due skill, care and diligence, in the interests of clients and the integrity 
of the financial services industry; (b) have and employ effectively the resources, procedures and appropriate 
technological systems for the proper performance of professional activities; (c) seek from clients appropriate 
and available information regarding their financial situations, financial product experience and objectives in 
connection with the financial service required; (d) act with circumspection and treat clients fairly in a situation of 
conflicting interests; and (e) comply with all applicable statutory or common law requirements applicable to the 
conduct of business. (2) A code of conduct must in particular contain provisions relating to (a) the making of 
adequate disclosures of relevant material information including disclosures of actual or potential own interests, 
in relation to dealings with clients; (b) adequate and appropriate record-keeping; (c) avoidance of fraudulent and 
misleading advertising canvassing and marketing; (d) proper safe-keeping, separation and protection of funds and 
transaction documentation of clients; (e) where appropriate, suitable guarantees or professional indemnity 
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stipulates how the GCC should be drafted and places certain duties and obligations on 
intermediaries to make adequate disclosure of relevant material information to the prospective 
policyholder. The relevant material information referred to pertains to any special terms or 
conditions contained in the insurance contract. For the purposes of this dissertation, clauses 3, 7 
and 8 of the GCC are relevant. 
 
Clause 3 of the GCC refers to the specific duties of a provider as defined in the FAIS Act, and 
the important sub-sections record the following:  
 
When a provider renders a financial service –  
(a) representations made and information provided to a client by the provider –   
(i) must be factually correct;  
(ii) must be provided in plain language, avoid uncertainty or confusion and 
not be misleading;  
(iii) must be adequate and appropriate in the circumstances of the particular 
financial service, taking into account the factually established or 
reasonably assumed level of knowledge of the client;  
(iv) must be provided timeously so as to afford the client reasonably 
sufficient time to make an informed decision about the proposed 
transaction;   
(v) may, subject to the provisions of this Code, be provided orally and, at the 
client‘s request, confirmed in writing within a reasonable time after such 
request;  
(vi) must, where provided in writing or by means of standard forms or 
format, be in a clear and readable print size, spacing and format;  
(2) (a) A provider must have appropriate procedures and systems in place to –  
(i) record such verbal and written communications relating to a financial 
service rendered to a client as are contemplated in the Act, this Code or 
any other Code drafted in terms of section 15 of the Act. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
or fidelity insurance cover, and mechanisms for adjustments of such guarantees or cover by the registrar in any 
particular case; and (f) any other matter which is necessary or expedient to be regulated in such code for the better 
achievement of the objects of this Act. 
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Section 7 of the FAIS Act refers to the information about the financial service and probably is 
the most important section for the purposes of this discussion. Section 7 records as follows:   
 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Code, a provider other than a direct marketer, must –  
(a) provide a reasonable and appropriate general explanation of the nature and 
material terms of the relevant contract or transaction to a client, and generally 
make full and frank disclosure of any information that would reasonably be 
expected, to enable the client to make an informed decision; 
(b) whenever reasonable and appropriate provide to the client any material 
contractual information and any material illustrations, projections or forecasts in 
the possession of the provider;  
(c)  … 
(vii) concise details of any special terms or conditions, exclusions of liability, 
waiting periods, loadings, penalties, excesses, restrictions or 
circumstances in which benefits will not be provided;  
… 
(x) any restrictions on or penalties for early termination of or withdrawal 
from the product, or other effects, if any, of such termination or 
withdrawal;  
… 
(9)(1) A provider must, subject to and in addition to the duties imposed by section 18 of the Act 
and section 3(2) of this Code, maintain a record of the advice furnished to a client as 
contemplated in section 8, which record must reflect the basis on which the advice was 
given. 
 
Section 8(2) of the FAIS Act read with section 7(1)(c)(vii) ensures that all information pertaining 
to onerous clauses must be disclosed by the intermediary to the policyholder and that the 
intermediary must ensure that the policyholder fully understands all the information and advice 
provided to him. Section 8(2) records the following: “The provider must take reasonable steps to 
ensure that the client understands the advice and that the client is in a position to make an 
informed decision.” 
 
It appears that the FAIS Act has taken the common law principles of good faith, care and skill 
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and has broken them down into a number of principles and rules that will show that the 
intermediary acted with good faith, care and skill if those principles and rules are complied 
with.39 
 
Another part of the GCC that applies to the provision of insurance is clause 15 which regulates 
the conduct of direct marketers and contains several requirements relating to the information that 
must be provided to a prospective insured.40 In addition, section 7(1)(c)(vii) read together with 
section 8 appears to be the most relevant section when disclosing onerous clauses in insurance 
contracts. 
 
It remains an open question why intermediaries consistently fail to understand what is required of them, 
this despite the fact that the FAIS Act and GCC appears to be in plain language, or if not entirely so, is 
quite detailed in listing the duties placed on intermediaries. It is in fact easier to analyse the problem with 
reference to actual FAIS Ombud decisions and court rulings.  
 
It is evident that the primary purpose of the GCC is to force financial services providers to make full and 
frank disclosures to clients and it is suggested that it is no longer possible for insurance companies to sell 
products in a “take it or leave it” fashion and subsequently to rely on misrepresentation to repudiate 
claims. This, in fact, signals a whole new dispensation in insurance where consumer vulnerability is 
addressed by statutory measures that are aimed at re-balancing the interests of the insurer and the 
policyholder. There can be no doubt that the FAIS Act was incredibly important in levelling the playing 
field between the insurer and the insured. The main question that remains is what the apparent shift in 
responsibilities from the insured to the insurer means and to that end, the following paragraphs provide an 
exposition of the 2018 Policyholder Protection Rules (PPRs) and the 2017 Insurance Act 
 
3.4 The 2018 PPRs 
 
Huneberg states that the PPRs in terms of both Acts (the LTIA and STIA) were first published in 
200441 in order to provide for issues such as rules for direct marketers,42 void provisions43 and 
                                                             
39  Hattingh and Millard (n 10) 86. 
40   See ss 15(1) and (2).  
41  Policyholder Protection Rules 2004. 
42  rule 4 of the 2004 PPRs. 
43  rule 5 of the 2004 PPRs. 
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general rules44 regulating to the agreement(s) between the insurer and the policyholder. She 
further elaborates as follows: 
“These rules were promulgated in order to provide for the notion of fairness in relation to 
certain issues surrounding the relationship between insurer and policyholder. Since the 
rules were promulgated in 2004, there have been some significant reforms. The most 
noteworthy reform was with regard to time bar clauses in 2010, following the decision of 
the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen v Napier.45 The outcome of this case led to an 
amendment of the PPRs at that time in terms of both the LTIA and the STIA by ensuring 
more manageable time frames for the institution of claims against insurers”.46 
 
It is by now trite that the new PPRs came into effect on 1 January 2018,47 formally incorporating 
the Treating Customers Fairly provisions. In addition, the 2018 PPRs contain extensive 
provisions on all aspects of short-term insurance but these rules do not apply retrospectively. 
This means that for policies that came into existence before 1 January 2018, the 2010 PPRs still 
apply. 
 
Currently, the principle of treating customers fairly (TCF) is embedded in the PPRs and these 
rules mainly aim to force insurers to treat customers fairly. The 2018 PPRs in terms of the STIA 
provide for extensive disclosures before, during and after the conclusion of an insurance 
contract. This in all likelihood is a sign that good faith no longer is a pre-contractual duty only 
                                                             
44  rule 6 of the 2004 PPRs. Huneberg S: (2018). “The fairness of the Forfeiture Clauses in short-Term 
Insurance contracts” LL.D (Insurance Law) [unpublished] University of Johannesburg 
http://ujcontent.uj.ac.za./vital/access/manage/index?sitename=Research%200utput 23. Although this thesis 
is mainly about fraud and forfeiture clauses, there can be no doubt that forfeiture clauses are but one 
example of complex clauses that are frequently found in insurance policies. 
 
45  2007 7 BCLR 691 (CC). The case saw the incorporation of rule 7.4 of the PPRs that entered into force on 
1 January 2010 and states that any time limitation provision may not include the 90-day period within 
which the insured may make representations to the insurer, and it must provide for a period of not less than 
six months after the expiry of the 90-day period for the institution of legal action. 
46 Huneberg S: (2018). “The fairness of the Forfeiture Clauses in short-Term Insurance contracts” LL.D 
(Insurance Law) [unpublished] University of Johannesburg 
http://ujcontent.uj.ac.za./vital/access/manage/index?sitename=Research%200utput 23. 
47  ibid. 
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but now extends to the contractual relationship. An advisor or intermediary must explain all 
features, including those so-called onerous clauses, to the prospective policyholder.48 
 
3.5  Application of the GCC and PPRs to direct marketing 
 
The discussion so far centred around those situations where an intermediary or advisor made 
personal contact with a prospective insured, but the reality these days is that most transactions 
take place telephonically or via the internet. The question is whether the GCC and the PPRs also 
address this reality. 
 
The watershed shift in the expectations of insurers was first verbalised by the court in the much-
quoted case of Mahadeo v Dial Direct Insurance Ltd.49  In casu, the insurer made use of a call-
centre script to obtain information from the prospective insurer. When a claim was later 
repudiated based on misrepresentation, the court sided with the policyholder, stating that the 
scope of the call-centre script provides an indication of the information that is indeed deemed 
material and that it would be wrong of the insurer to expect the policyholder to provide 
information outside this script, later relying on the materiality of such non-disclosure to repudiate 
a claim. What is manifestly true is that the GCC supports the notion that insurance advisors and 
intermediaries have a duty to provide a service that must be factually correct,50 avoid uncertainty 
or confusion and should not be misleading,51 be provided in plain language,52 and, where in 
writing, must be in a clear and readable print size, spacing and format,53 must be adequate and 
appropriate in the circumstances,54 must be provided timeously so as to afford the client 
reasonably sufficient time to make an informed decision,55 must be rendered in accordance with 
the contractual relationship and reasonable requests or instructions of the client,56 and must be 
executed as soon as reasonably possible and with the interest of the client in mind and accorded 
                                                             
48  Insurance Law) [unpublished] University of Johannesburg 
http://ujcontent.uj.ac.za./vital/access/manage/index?sitename=Research%200utput 
49  [2008] 2 All SA 352 (W); 2008 4 SA 80 (W) 86B-87D. 
50  s 3(1)(a)(i) of the FAIS GCC. 
51  s 3(1)(a)(ii) of the FAIS GCC. 
52  ibid. 
53  s 3(1)(a)(vi) of the FAIS GCC. 
54  s 3(1)(a)(iii) of the FAIS GCC. 
55  s 3(1)(a)(iv) of the FAIS GCC. 
56  s 3(1)(a)(v) of the FAIS GCC. 
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priority over any interest of the provider.57  
 
Where direct marketing is used the transaction usually is conducted through an employee of the 
company. When an insurance contract comes about through direct marketing, the employee will 
usually disclose details such as the risk and the premium. However, the policyholder will in all 
likelihood not question anything that the direct marketer does not raise. Also, the policyholder 
usually only receives a copy of the actual policy much later than they should. It seldom occurs in 
practice that the direct marketer mentions onerous clauses contained in the contract. The liability 
in this instance will fall on the insurer (the company whom the employee is representing). The 
Code provides that direct marketers do not have to disclose all information to the client over the 
telephone because it is not practical. The fact remains that some information must be provided to 
the client prior to the conclusion of the transaction. This aspect of direct marketing is often 
confusing, which is why it is best explained by Millard and Hattingh as dividing disclosure 
requirements into three groups, namely, information that should be supplied when rendering the 
service; information that should be disclosed where advice is rendered; and information that 
should be disclosed prior to the conclusion of the transaction. This includes special terms and 
conditions, exclusions, waiting periods, loadings, penalties, excesses, restrictions or 
circumstances in which benefits will not be provided.58  
 
Huneberg is of the opinion that direct marketers as well as intermediaries and advisors are under 
a general duty of disclosure towards policyholders.59 This includes the duty to disclose “onerous 
clauses” such as forfeiture clauses, average clauses, excess payments, exclusions and other 
clauses that serve to place a burden on policyholders.60 Huneberg comments that policyholders 
are often not informed of onerous clauses and that this happens despite the very clear statutory 
imperative in section 7(1)(c)(vii) on direct marketers, advisors and intermediaries to explain the 
                                                             
57  s 3(1)(d) of the FAIS GCC. 
58  Hattingh and Millard (n 10) 85; ss 15(1)-15(3) of the GCC. It should be kept in mind that there is still a 
common law duty to act in good faith and with care and skill. See also Hattingh and Millard (n 10) 85. See 
also Huneberg S: (2018). “The fairness of the Forfeiture Clauses in short-Term Insurance contracts” LL.D 
(Insurance Law) [unpublished] University of Johannesburg 
http://ujcontent.uj.ac.za./vital/access/manage/index?sitename=Research%200utput 57. 
 
 
60  Ibid. 
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nature and extent of these clauses to prospective policyholders.61 The writer agrees with 
Huneberg, namely that the problem with onerous clauses at the advice and point of sale stage is 
that these are often simply ignored by those who sell insurance.62 She uses examples from recent 
FAIS Ombud determinations and this dissertation draws on her insights in the next chapter.63 At 
this point in time in the discussion it is prudent to make reference to the FAIS Ombud 
determination in Masimdumise Gabriel Bhengu (Complainant) v Outsurance Insurance 
Company Limited (Respondent).64 The basis of the complainant’s case was that he had not been 
advised that any item over R1 500 should be specifically listed. Therefore, Outsurance had to 
pay him for or provide him with another laptop computer. The respondent’s reply essentially was 
that they have a “peril-based facility”. According to them, this means that they only cover named 
perils. Perils not named are simply not covered. As there was no Out-and-About Cover, the 
computer was not covered.As the sales process was scripted, the complainant was only required 
to give limited answers, and the recorded conversation does not reveal that Outsurance attempted 
to actually obtain detailed information from the client which would enable the respondent to 
comply with sections 15(2)(a) and 3(1)(a)(iii) of the Code. Here, the Ombud states in no 
uncertain terms that Outsurance used “cold calling”, a practice whereby the initiative to sell 
insurance goes out from the insurer or its authorised call centre. What emerges from Huneberg’s 
discussion is a practical example of how the failure to properly disclose onerous clauses is not 
only against the law but also devastating to bona fide, unsuspecting clients. 
 
The problem with call centre scripts is that skilled sales people compile these. This, together with 
the fact that the primary focus is on the sale and the advantages of the product in question, will 
perhaps explain why a representative that has sunk his hooks into a prospective client will almost 
certainly fail to highlight limitations, exclusions and other less popular features of a product as 
that might just cause him the loss of a sale. It is suggested that this determination, to a certain 
                                                             
61  Ibid. 
62  Huneberg S: (2018). “The fairness of the Forfeiture Clauses in short-Term Insurance contracts” LL.D 
(Insurance Law) [unpublished] University of Johannesburg 
http://ujcontent.uj.ac.za./vital/access/manage/index?sitename=Research%200utput 58. 
63  Ibid n58 
64  Case No FAIS 06001/14-15/ KZN 3. See also Huneberg S: (2018). “The fairness of the Forfeiture Clauses 
in short-Term Insurance contracts” LL.D (Insurance Law) [unpublished] University of Johannesburg 
http://ujcontent.uj.ac.za./vital/access/manage/index?sitename=Research%200utput 60. 
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extent, echoes the sentiments of the Court in Mahadeo v Dial Direct Insurance Limited65 on 
questions that are asked to clients by call centres. This case shows that direct marketers are well-
trained sellers with product knowledge who should ask the correct questions. Failure to do so is 
irresponsible66 
 
3.6 Evaluation of statutory provisions: Conclusion  
 
The STIA differs from the LTIA in that section 7(1)(a)(i) provides that an intermediary is 
required to furnish the insured with a copy of the written agreement which sets out the terms and 
conditions, but this is as far as the section goes. There is no specific mention of the duty to 
disclose or to explain terms recorded in an insurance contract to the prospective policyholder. In 
most cases the direct marketing is applicable to non-life policies, and it is my respectful 
submission that the STIA also falls short from a transparency and information point of view 
notwithstanding Rule 9 of the PPRs, which provides for penalties that will be imposed against 
the intermediary for failure to comply with the PPRs. However, despite the establishment of the 
office of the Ombud, a number of cases are still reported every year pertaining to the 
intermediary‘s failure to disclose material onerous clauses in the contract to the prospective 
policyholders, which means that the statutory provisions are still lacking in forcing the 
intermediaries to comply with them. 
  
                                                             
65  (06/3536) [2007] ZAGPHC 305. 
66  Millard and Kuschke (n 33) 2411 2422. S 1(1) of the GCC, sv “direct marketer” defines direct marketing as 
“the rendering of financial services by way of telephone, internet, media insert, direct mail, or electronic 
mail, excluding any such means which are advertisements not containing transaction requirements”. The 
writers also refer to Lappeman Diamond Cutting Works (Pty) Ltd v MIB Group (Pty) Ltd (unreported) (W) 
Juta’s Insurance L Bul 101. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
OMBUD DETERMINATIONS  
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
As was explained in the previous chapter, the current framework in terms of the FAIS Act 
supplements the common law. It is really when one peruses the cases that are decided by the 
FAIS Ombud that one understands how the FAIS Act operates in practice. 
 
The South African financial services industry has been using alternative dispute resolution 
services for quite some time and distinguishes primarily between statutory Ombud schemes and 
voluntary Ombud schemes. Voluntary Ombud schemes include the Ombudsman for Long-Term 
Insurance and the Ombudsman for Short-Term Insurance. These two ombudsmen schemes 
mostly adjudicate on product-related issues and not issues where incorrect or incomplete advice 
was rendered. Statutory Ombud schemes include the Pension Fund Adjudicator and the FAIS 
Ombud.67 The latter was established by section 20 of the FAIS Act. The mandate of the Ombud 
is to consider and dispose of complaints in a procedurally fair, informal, economical and 
expeditious manner by reference to what is equitable in all the circumstances, with due regard to 
the contractual arrangement or other legal relationship between the complainant and any other 
party to the complaint, as well as to the provisions of this Act. There is a statutory duty to base 
decisions on fairness and the law. The FAIS Ombud‘s jurisdiction is set out in section 26 of the 
FAIS Act. 
 
The Ombud may use both the law and fairness when adjudicating a matter, and the courts are 
bound by precedent and must apply the law. This may not always ensure the best result as each 
case should be determined on its own facts and circumstances. Ombud decisions should rather 
not be reported as precedents, as fairness essentially focuses on what is fair in a particular case, 
based on considerations wider than the legal principles, whereas court cases should be precedents 
as the argument of stare decisis is that like cases should be treated alike. The next paragraph 
                                                             
67 Hattingh and Millard (n 10) 184-187. 
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canvasses a number of determinations in order to illustrate how intermediaries fail in their duties 
to provide information to prospective policyholders. 
 
4.2 FAIS Ombud determination 
 
4.2.1 General 
 
The annual report published by the FAIS Ombud contains a list of trends that are picked up from 
cases referred to the Ombud.68 One of the common trends found in these cases is the failure of 
the intermediary to provide the policyholder with details pertaining to any special terms, 
exclusions of liability, restrictions, to name but a few. The cases that will be discussed highlight 
the issue of non-disclosure by the intermediary of onerous clauses, despite the enactment of what 
appears to be clear and concise legislation. 
 
4.2.2 Mafa Mkhohlwa v Workers Life Assurance Company Limited69 
 
In this particular case the Ombud had to adjudicate between two parties where there was an 
allegation of a failure on the part of the intermediary to disclose an exclusionary clause dealing 
with a specific medical condition, and whether the policyholder had disclosed his medical 
condition. The Ombud held:  
 
Being of such an onerous nature, there can be no dispute that the insurer‘s representatives were 
under a duty to disclose and explain these exclusionary clauses to a prospective client. This is a 
requirement of the Code ... Due to the extraordinary breadth of the exclusions, it must be 
necessary, not only to disclose and explain the exclusions, it is also necessary to disclose the 
medical questionnaire that will have to be completed in the event of a claim ... Accordingly, 
respondent cannot, in these circumstances, rely on any onus on complainant to read the policy 
and complain if he did not understand anything.70 
 
                                                             
68  Ombud Settlement Cases https://www.moonstone.co.za/ombud-settlement-cases    
69  Case No FAIS 03315/14-15/ EC 2 24.  
70  para 63. 
Page 28 of 40 
 
It appears that something more than a mere disclosure is required by the FAIS Act. Requesting a 
policyholder to merely read the insurance contract, pointing out that there are onerous clauses 
contained in the said contract, falls short of what is required of the intermediary in terms of the 
FAIS Act. The Court in fact referred to the Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) standard.71 The 
TCF principle is referred to in Twin Peaks and has been infused into the proposed legislation, but 
will only truly become part of our law once that legislation has been enacted.72 
 
4.2.3 Fliptrans CC v S & P Insurance Advisors (Pty) Ltd t/a McCrystal and Partners and 
E Soloms73 
 
The dispute between the claimant and the respondents occurred from the repudiation of the 
claimant’s claim in terms of a short-term insurance policy. The insurance policy involved the 
complainant’s motorcycle, which had been stolen. The complainant alleged that the respondents, 
in particular the intermediary, had failed in their duties as they did not disclose that they required 
the insured motorcycle to be fitted with a tracking device, failing which the complainant would 
not meet a term of the policy which required such a device to be fitted. The failure was the very 
basis upon which the insurer repudiated the complainant‘s claim. The respondents claimed that 
the claimant knew about the security requirement in that the claimant had signed the proposal 
form which contained the security requirement, but no mention was made of having brought the 
requirement to the complainant’s attention. The main question was whether the respondent had 
failed in his duties as set out in section 7(1)(c)(vii) of the GCC.74 
 
The complainant did not deny signing the form, but averred that he had signed a number of 
documents on that day and at no stage did the respondents inform the policyholder that a tracking 
device was required to be fitted. The respondent stated that once the application form had been 
completed, the requirement was reaffirmed when it had sent a document titled confirmation of 
cover to the complainant. The Ombud referred to section16 of the FAIS Act and section 
                                                             
71  para 29. 
72  Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin Vol 20 No 1 2017 4-7. 
73  Case No FAIS 07987/11-12 GP3. 
74  See also Huneberg S: (2018). “The fairness of the Forfeiture Clauses in short-Term Insurance contracts” 
LL.D (Insurance Law) [unpublished] University of Johannesburg 
http://ujcontent.uj.ac.za./vital/access/manage/index?sitename=Research%200utput  58-60 for a detailed 
discussion of this determination. 
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7(1)(c)(vii) of the GCC which requires full disclosure of any exclusions of liability. The 
respondent suggested that it was an intermediary that rendered the advice and that the FAIS Act 
did not apply to short term insurance.75 
 
The Ombud held that the respondents had failed to advise the complainant of the meaning and 
consequences of the security requirement clause and that the mere fact that they had sent the 
certificate of insurance to the complainant could not be taken to show that the complainant was 
aware of the clause. The respondents could not prove that the complainant knew of the clause, let 
alone understood the meaning of the clause. The certificate provided by the respondent referred 
merely to excess, not to exclusionary clauses. The respondent’s argument was essentially that the 
duty was on the claimant to read the contract that was sent to him, and to make sense of the 
material clauses without explanation. The insurance that was sold was incidental to the sake of 
the motorcycle and the respondents were not involved in the transaction. The Ombud held that 
the respondent had failed to advise the complainant of the security requirement and that their 
conduct undermined the GCC, in particular to treat clients fairly. 76  
 
4.2.4 Jacques du Toit v Barrington Insurance Brokers (Pty) Ltd and John Frayne77 
 
In this particular case the respondent delivered the policy documents to the claimant with a note 
that the claimant should read the policy documents. There was no evidence to suggest that the 
insurer or the intermediary advised the claimant of the material terms pertaining to the 
requirements of a tracking device, or that the requirements were explained to the claimant in 
plain language. The respondents merely relied on the fact that the policy document was delivered 
to the complainant, and expected the complainant to have read and understood the policy. There 
was a duty on the intermediary to disclose the special conditions to the claimant. 
 
The Ombud held that the respondents’ conduct was negligent and amounted to a breach of 
sections 2, 3(1)(a) and 7(1)(a), (b) and (c) FAIS Act. This again proves the point in paragraph 
4.2.3 above, namely, that the GCC attaches great importance to actual, proper disclosure of 
                                                             
75  ibid. 
76  http://www.faisombud.co.za/determinations  
77  Case No FAIS 01129/13-14/ GP 3. 
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essential information pertaining to onerous clauses.78 
4.2.5 A case of none disclosure by policyholder79 
In the case of Mr H, insurance company Centriq rejected his claim for damage to a motorcycle, 
because the person riding it – Mr H’s son – was not a named rider on the policy. 
In his complaint to the ombudsman, Mr H said he had clearly told his (independent) broker that 
he had bought the bike for his son to use to travel to school. He also pointed out that the policy 
schedule contained additional excesses that were applicable to riders under the age of 25, and 
these should not have been included on the schedule if the insurer did not intend to cover people 
other than the named rider. 
Mr H said he was prepared to pay the additional excess for his son, who was under the age of 25. 
In its response to the complaint, Centriq said it had not received any communication from the 
broker stating that it was Mr H’s son who would be riding the motorcycle, and persisted in 
rejecting the claim. The insurer suggested that the complaint be directed to the financial advice 
ombud for investigation into the conduct of the broker. 
The ombudsman asked Centriq to provide a copy of the proposal form or a recording of the 
underwriting conversation as proof that it had required Mr H to disclose the details of the named 
riders. The insurer also had to show that Mr H had been informed that there would be no cover 
for riders not named on the policy. 
The ombudsman found that the proposal form did not create an obligation on Mr H to disclose 
the details of the named riders on the policy. Furthermore, there was no recording of an 
underwriting conversation, because the risk was accepted on the basis of the information on the 
proposal form alone. 
The ombudsman recommended that the claim be paid, because Centriq had failed to comply with 
the Policyholder Protection Rules, in particular the rule that requires an insurer to provide the 
customer, before entering into a contract, with the “concise details of any special terms and 
conditions, exclusions, waiting periods, loadings, penalties, excesses, restrictions or 
circumstances in which benefits will not be provided”. 
Centriq agreed to settle the claim with a deduction of the additional excess for the rider being 
under the age of 25. Mr H accepted the settlement.  
                                                             
78   n 67. 
79    https://www.iol.co.za/personal-finance/insurance/short-term-insurance-ombud-recovers-r87m-for- 
policyholders-24182982 
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4.2.6 Court decision: Lappeman Diamond Cutting Works (Pty) Ltd v MIB Group (Pty) Ltd80 
 
This case differs from the aforementioned cases in that this dispute was not adjudicated by the 
Ombud but by the Supreme Court of Appeal. The Court dealt with the nature and extent of the 
specialist insurance broker‘s duty to his client to draw to the attention of the client, and to 
explain the existence of an onerous term in an insurance policy. In the court a quo the appellant 
lodged a claim against the respondent for lost diamonds which claim was later repudiated by the 
respondent. The appellant then instituted action against the respondent based on the respondent’s 
representative’s alleged negligent performance. 
 
More specifically, the appellant entered into a contract with the respondent in terms of which the 
respondent‘s broker would procure insurance from certain underwriters. The respondent‘s 
representative undertook to familiarise himself with the appellant‘s business, which included 
ascertaining whether the appellant was able to fulfil the requirements of an underwriter in terms 
of a policy. The respondent‘s representative was obligated to draw the appellant’s attention to 
any promissory warranties that applied to the policy. The provision relied on by the underwriters 
to avoid the claim made by the appellant was clause (b) of the Specific Conditions which read: 
“It is understood and agreed that the assured shall keep detailed records of all sales, purchases 
and other transactions and that such records shall be available for inspection by the underwriters 
or their representatives in case of a claim being made under this insurance certificate.”81 
 
The appellant had failed to keep records as required in terms of the policy. The court a quo found 
that the clause amounted to a promissory warranty and the appellant had breached the said 
warranty. 
 
The appellant‘s case was based on the fact that the representative of the respondent failed to 
advise him of the existence of this provision that placed certain obligations on the appellant, and 
                                                             
80  Case No 312/2002 (unreported) SCA 2003. 
81  Case No 312/2002 (unreported) (W) 2003 para 7. 
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that the representative failed to familiarise himself with the appellant’s business in that they 
would have known that it was impossible for the appellant to comply with such a provision. In 
addition, the court a quo held that there was no breach on the part of the respondent. Cloete J 
dissented, and held that “[t]here had been a breach of a duty by the respondent and its 
representative in that they failed to adequately enquire about the appellant’s manners of doing 
business”.82  
 
The appellant maintained that it had kept proper records of the diamonds that had been stolen, 
and in light of the fact that there is a tradition of confidentiality in the diamond trade, certain 
records of transactions were not kept in order to protect the identity of the purchaser. 
 
The Court also referred to the matter of McNealy v The Pennine Insurance Co Ltd,83 where a 
policy excluded liability if the insured was a musician, and where the broker had failed to 
establish whether the insured was such. The Court held that the broker was in breach of its duty 
to draw the insured‘s attention to the exclusion. The Court was of the view that this case did not 
assist the present applicant as in McNealy, as the “broker had failed to advise the insured of the 
existence of the exclusion”.84 In this case of Lappeman the majority judgment dismissed the 
appeal. 
 
4.3 Conclusion  
 
It is clear that the courts deal with insurance intermediary cases very differently. An example is 
the case of Lappeman quoted above to the Ombud. As evident from the aftermath of the FAIS 
Act, the way in which the FAIS Ombud applies principles of fairness has raised concerns 
regarding contractual certainty about consumer rights and how to apply and interpret 
principles.85 Although the FAIS Act in fact did sharpen the focus on consumers, the confusion on 
fairness and transparency remains and the new legislative dispensation may cause further 
confusion. The TCF principles have become part of the new regulatory framework, and the 
                                                             
82  ibid para 9. 
83  [1978] 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 18 (CA). 
84  ibid. 
85  Millard (n 1) 1 15. 
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courts are expected to take into account when adjudicating on insurance matters that fairness no 
longer is the only consideration to be taken into account in cases that are presented before the 
FAIS Ombud.  
 
In the past much mis-selling and many scams have arisen from hard-sell direct marketing. The 
emphasis in the PPRs is to place a requirement on direct marketers to take due care at all times to 
provide customer with honest, fair, diligent and skillful service. 
From a regulatory point of view, transparency on the part of insurers is an imperative and plain 
language a requirement. The PPRs are about fairness and transparency – they prevent insurers 
from hiding behind fine print and require that consumers be provided with all relevant 
information around premium calculations, benefits and pay-outs.” The enforcement of the PPRs 
has assisted in the TCF principles becoming entrenched in every aspect of business and market 
conduct. 
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CHAPTER 5:   
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Do intermediaries and advisors comply with their duties to disclose onerous terms to 
prospective policy holders?  
 
In insurance law there is a mixed system of rules and principles. We rely on both common law 
and statutes. It should already be trite law that there is a duty to inform policyholders of onerous 
clauses in insurance contracts and there should be no need to further legislate this duty. 
 
Why do intermediaries continue to fail to disclose onerous clauses contained in insurance 
contracts? Perhaps the problem lies with intermediaries receiving poor product training, or their 
lack of knowledge of what is required from them in terms of the law, or their own opportunistic 
behaviour to conclude the sale and collect their commission at all costs. Maybe it is a 
combination of factors. The introduction of a single Act regulating the insurance industry may 
prove to be a solution to the problems in that there is too much legislation that intermediaries are 
unable to keep up with, or are not required to do. A further suggestion would be for the 
legislature to outlaw provisions that are patently unfair and often form the subject matter of 
adjudications by courts and the FAIS Ombud. A further solution may be to ensure that customers 
are well informed of their rights in insurance contracts. Perhaps this would be the case if the 
legislation were recorded in plain language that is easy to understand. 
 
Insurance products have never changed. It is the insurers that have failed to take the necessary 
steps to simplify policies to eliminate confusion on the part of the policyholder. As it stands, 
there is a disconnect between the advice given by the intermediary and the insurance product 
being sold. If products are simplified, policyholders may be better advised. If insurance contracts 
are simplified and truly drafted in plain language, half the battle would have been won. Insurers 
need to accept this responsibility that rests on their shoulders, and intermediaries should go 
above and beyond in ensuring that onerous clauses are disclosed to policyholders, as the 
Page 35 of 40 
 
consequences for failing to do so are far more detrimental than ensuring that the policyholder is 
well informed. 
 
It may be concluded that intermediaries have always had onerous duties of disclosure and these 
were not limited to the essential elements of insurance contracts. There are strict obligations to 
disclose onerous clauses and to ensure that prospective policyholders are fully aware of these. 
Legislation, however strict and detailed, is not enough. Although there has been an improvement 
in the wake of the FAIS Act and the 2018 PPR, consumer education and financial literacy needs 
to be high on the agenda of the new market conduct regulator. 
 
5.2 Conclusion 
Because of the fact that insurance contracts are complex, prospective policyholders should make 
sure that they read the offer presented to them, and acquaint themselves fully with the details of 
the insurance contract prior to entering into the said contract.86 Because of the lack of equality in 
the relationship between prospective policyholders and intermediaries and advisors there 
undeniably is a duty on intermediaries to disclose and explain the terms of a policy to the 
prospective policyholder, despite the fact that this duty can be traced back to specific common 
law duties and have subsequently become more rules-problematic.87 
 
Transparency on the part of both the intermediary and prospective policyholder is required and 
financial literacy should be prioritised by the new market conduct regulator. Higher levels of 
literacy may see prospective policyholders become more proactive and less reliant on 
intermediaries’ presentations. However, the reality remains that intermediaries earn commission 
for services they do not render and policyholders often are not in a position to interpret onerous 
clauses and realise the implications of these. 
 
As a result, it will no longer be sufficient to apply only the law, but courts will also have to 
measure the conduct of contracting parties against the TCF outcomes and in the light of the 
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product life cycle. It is further suggested that it will no longer be possible to consider only the 
policy document as the complete record that sets out the rights and duties of the parties, and the 
issues such as the way in which the product was advertised and sold, will now also have to be 
considered by the courts.88 
 
Transparency as a value is firmly embedded not only in common law rules pertaining to pre-
contractual negotiations that have bearing on insurance contracts, but also in the detailed rules 
that govern the behaviour of insurers, intermediaries and advisors. This is a matter with which 
most modern-day insurance lawyers struggle, as common law and statutory principles cannot be 
disengaged into two autonomous sets of rules. In a nutshell, irrespective of the source of the 
rules, transparency is brought about when all the relevant information is completely, clearly and 
with certainty disclosed in an intelligible manner. Not only does this promote trust in our 
financial services industry, but it also promotes a feeling of security for consumers.  
 
The drive to professionalise the financial services industry and to develop the skills and 
knowledge of those that sell insurance products not only saw the promulgation of the FAISA Act 
but also amendments to the PPRs. The message is clear: The insurance industry cannot afford to 
do business in a way that is not consumer-orientated and transparent. Mistakes cost money. 
Institutions such as the FAIS Ombud make it possible for aggrieved clients to enforce their rights 
and over and above civil judgments against service providers, the payment of exorbitant 
penalties represents the stick, in case the carrot (the promise of satisfied, well-informed clients) 
was not juicy enough.  
 
It is evident that direct marketers as well as intermediaries and advisors are under a general duty 
of disclosure towards policyholders, especially to disclose “onerous” clauses such as forfeiture 
clauses to policyholders early on in the relationship. 
 
The South African legislative framework is for financial service providers, although complicated 
and very detailed, complements common law rules, and together these rules form a sound 
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platform which should inspire consumer confidence.89 In short, one may conclude that 
intermediaries are expected to provide prospective policyholders with clear information and to 
ensure that they are kept appropriately informed before, during and after the point of sale. They 
must take reasonable steps to communicate and explain all information in a way that is clear, fair 
and not misleading to the prospective policyholder. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
89  Millard and Kuschke (n 33) 6. 
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